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Abstract 
Same-sex families are a recent legal reality in Eu-
rope. Socially and politically, they have been rec-
ognized only since 1989. Legal recognition
spread over Europe in a two-phase process. At
first, a specific and separated status (registered
partnerships, civil union, Eingetragene Partner-
schaft) has been granted to same-sex families,
adding substantially to their social visibility. Sub-
sequently, same-sex families have gained access
to the general status of marriage. This second
phase closes the phase of specific visibility and
brings same-sex families back into the discretion
of private life. A European overview of this dou-
ble process may help our understanding of how
homosexuality is socially and politically managed
in different regions of Europe. Same-sex families
are also a recent socio-demographic reality.
Same-sex couples and families emerged in the
twentieth and twenty first century. This paper will
present socio-demographic facts on European
same-sex families. It will also hazard some hy-
potheses on how these families seem to develop
and how they are managed in Europe. 
 
 Zusammenfassung 
Der Rechtsstatus von Familien mit einem gleich-
geschlechtlichen Elternpaar erfährt in Europa zu-
nehmend Akzeptanz. In sozialer und politischer 
Hinsicht werden sie erst seit 1989 anerkannt. Die 
rechtliche Anerkennung vollzog sich in Europa in 
zwei Phasen. Zunächst als spezieller Status, der 
nur gleichgeschlechtlichen Paaren vorbehalten 
war, was zu einem enormen Zuwachs an sozialer 
Wahrnehmung geführt hat. Im Anschluss daran 
erfolgte die Öffnung der Ehe. Diese zweite Phase 
stellt ein Ende der besonderen Sichtbarkeit und 
Wahrnehmbarkeit gleichgeschlechtlicher Paare 
dar und erlaubt es ihnen, ihre Beziehung in der 
Diskretion des Privaten zu leben. Gleichge-
schlechtliche Familien bilden heute eine bedeut-
same soziale Realität. Ein Überblick dieser Pro-
zessphasen im europäischen Vergleich soll zei-
gen, wie mit Homosexualität in verschiedenen 
Regionen Europas sozial und politisch umgegan-
gen wird. Dieser Beitrag präsentiert soziodemo-
graphische Fakten zu gleichgeschlechtlichen Fa-
milienkonstellationen im europäischen Kontext 
und wird einige Hypothesen hinsichtlich der Ent-
wicklung und des Umgangs mit diesen Familien-
formen aufstellen.
  
 
This presentation refers to recent research for the French ministry of Labor and Social 
Cohesion on same-sex unions in Europe (Banens, 2010, 2011; Banens et al., 2008, 2013). 
It analyzes how Europe regulates and integrates same-sex couples and homosexuality in 
general from two types of evidence: legal data on the new statutes for same-sex unions 
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and demographic data on same-sex couples and the use they make of the new statutes. 
Please note I use the word “union” as a general category for the registration of a civil 
partnership, a civil union, a same-sex marriage, a same-sex Pacs, etc.  
The registration of same-sex unions started in 1989, in Denmark. A few years later, 
the Danish sociologist Henning Bech (1997) noted what he thought to be low registration 
frequencies (769 unions registered between October 1st 1989 and the end of 1990). He ar-
gued that Danish lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) people had been fighting 
for the right to register their partnership but that they were not interested in using this 
right. Michael Warner (1999) picked up this argument and turned it into a political stance 
against same-sex unions. Soon after, William Eskridge and Darren Spedale (2006) came 
to study same-sex unions in Europe. They took the opposite stance arguing that couples 
did register as soon as this was of interest for them. And so did Lee Badgett (2009). Hun-
dreds of scholars joined each side of the debate and discussed normalization, hetero-
normativity, gay citizenship and, more generally, the social organization of homosexuali-
ty through gay marriage.  
My work is not for neither against same-sex unions. It is on the social organization of 
homosexuality and on European diversity in doing so.  
Let’s start with the recent news: France celebrated its first same-sex marriage one 
month ago. Many people, including the media, wonder if there will be a same-sex mar-
riage boom in France, if same-sex couples will use marriage more than they used the Pacs 
(Pacte civil de solidarité) until now. So let’s see French same-sex Pacs frequencies until 
now.  
 
Figure 1. Same-sex union rates for 100 000 inhabitants, France 1999-2015.  
 
Source: INED – Ministère de la Justice. Rates and trend calculated by author. 
 
Same-sex Pacs started at the end of 1999. Frequencies began at about 5 for 100 000 in-
habitants and increased steadily until 14 in 2010, last year of published data. Extrapola-
tion shows that it could be about 16 today. Will this trend change? Will it get steeper? 
What happened in countries that already opened marriage after some years of civil part-
nership? 
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Figure 2. Same-sex union rates for 100 000 inhabitants, Norway, Sweden, Iceland. 
 
 
 
Source: National Offices for Statistics. Rates and trends calculated by author. 
 
Norway registers same-sex marriages since January 2009. Nothing really happened in 
terms of frequency rates. Sweden followed in May 2009. Swedish frequencies did not re-
ally change either. Iceland was the third Scandinavian country to open marriage in June 
2011. Again, frequencies seem to continue as before. Opening up marriage did not change 
significantly same-sex union frequencies in Scandinavia. Please note also that Scandina-
vian frequencies reach maximums of about 5 for 100 000 inhabitants so far, which is 
about three times lower than current French rates. We will come back to this later. 
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Figure 3. Same-sex union rates for 100 000 inhabitants, the Netherlands 1998-2015. 
 
Source: CBS. Rates and trend calculated by author. 
 
One country did experience a same-sex marriage boom after opening marriage: the Neth-
erlands. The boom did not last though. After two years, frequencies fell back to where 
they were before opening marriage.  
So the first conclusion of this survey is that same-sex union frequencies are not de-
termined by the symbolic statute of the union, in none of the European countries observed 
until now. They are not determined either by the rights and duties that go with the statute, 
because French Pacs is known to be much “lighter” than the Scandinavian partnerships 
and Dutch marriage. 
The second conclusion is that all countries show stable frequency rates. So there seem 
to be national determinants that produce and reproduce same-sex union behavior.   
The third conclusion, most interestingly, is that there is extreme divergence in same-
sex union behavior. Some countries show three times higher frequencies than others. So, 
national determinants seem not only to be stable inside of each country but also very di-
verse between countries.  
My research is on this stable diversity. It tries to define the determinants and to de-
termine what it tells us about the social organization of homosexuality. 
The first evidence is legal. It comes from the way Western Europe legally recognized 
same-sex unions. Since 1989, more than twenty European countries have introduced a le-
gal statute for same-sex couples, but it happened through two distinct waves. 
The first wave created specific statutes, known as “registered partnership”, “civil un-
ion”, etc. These statutes were open, and they still are, to same-sex couples only. They are 
based on separateness: there is marriage for heterosexual unions, and there is civil part-
nership for same-sex unions. Separateness permits unequal rights: unequal adoption 
rights, parenting rights, wedding ceremony rights, fiscal and social rights. But even where 
rights are equal, they remain separate: gay rights for gay citizens, straight rights for straight 
citizens. Separate rights rely on visibility, and create visibility. This first, differentialist 
wave started in the Scandinavian countries, came down to Germany, the Czech Republic 
and Switzerland before reaching the UK, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia. 
Nine years after the beginning of the differentialist wave started the universalist wave. 
It created universal statutes, open to both same-sex and opposite-sex families. The Dutch 
civil partnership was the first universal statute to be adopted in 1998. The Belgian cohabi-
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tation contract was the second. The French Pacs the third. A few years later, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark and France opened 
marriage to same-sex couples. In these countries, marriage came to fall into the category 
of “universal statutes”. Universal statutes don’t subdivide society into different groups. 
They don’t create specific gay and lesbian rights. They don’t create visibility. 
Please note the universalist wave did not start in France but in the Netherlands. Bel-
gium, Spain and the other countries followed the Netherlands, not France. Please note al-
so that the differentialist wave did not start in the UK but in Scandinavia and that it 
reached Germany and Central Europe before the UK. So, the legal recognition of same-
sex unions is about universalism opposing differentialism, but it is not about France op-
posing the UK. 
 
Figure 4.  Differentialst (red) and universalist (blue) legal recognition of same-sex statutes 
as they were at introduction.  
 
 
 
Source: See Banens, 2010. 
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As far as homosexuality is concerned, the distinction between legal universalism and dif-
ferentialism has a long history. Universalist countries decriminalized consenting adult 
homosexuality at the very beginning of the 19th century. Differentialist countries decrimi-
nalized more than one century later, often quite recently. Universalist countries never re-
criminalized homosexuality as is often thought. Most of them maintained discriminating 
ages of consent, but that was the case all over Europe. Discrimination persisted after de-
criminalization and has been abolished long time after, sometimes not before the twenty 
first century like in England, Hungary and Portugal. But decriminalization, of course, was 
the main step and this step occurred in Europe through two waves, distant by one and a 
half century. Surprisingly, the recent recognition of same-sex unions replayed exactly the 
same two waves. This persisting dividing line inside of Europe shows persisting cultural 
diversity. 
There is an evident legal reason: the universalist countries adopted the Napoleonic 
Code, the differentialist countries did not. The Napoleonic Code declared sexuality a pri-
vate affair, just as religion. At the time, no legislator thought of homosexuals as a sexual 
minority. It was a sexual practice. Universalist decriminalization, then, was based on the 
principle of freedom of sexuality exactly like the separation of state and church was based 
on the principle of freedom of religion and not on secularization. Both spheres got free in 
private life, ignored by the State, invisible.  
When differentialist Europe decriminalized homosexuality, it was not on the principle 
of freedom but on the principle of equality. Northern European legislators saw homosex-
uality as a sexual minority, and separateness had been “proven”. This took about a centu-
ry. Northern European legislators had to be convinced that homosexuals can’t be healed 
and that heterosexuals can’t get contaminated. In other words, that separateness is total. 
Only then, they accepted to decriminalize homosexuality on the principle of equality be-
tween social groups.  
Invisibility and State ignorance at one side, separateness and specific recognition at 
the other. Sexual freedom at one side, sexual equality at the other. And it happened twice: 
once for decriminalizing homosexuality, once for recognizing same-sex unions. This 
shows strong continuity in the social and political management of sexuality. 
The distinction between universalist and differentialist Europe has been noticed and 
analyzed by many scholars and at all levels: in ideology (McCaffrey, 2005; Fassin, 2001), 
in grass roots politics (Fillieule and Duyvendak, 1999), and in personal intimacy (Pro-
vencher, 2007). It remains an important and meaningful distinction inside of Europe. But 
we should keep in mind that: 
 
1/ universalism and differentialism are present in all European countries. Many national 
debates illustrate this. “Outrage” is a universalist English LGBT movement. Irène 
Théry is an influential differentialist French sociologist. Sweden and Hungary have 
been preparing universalist statutes before turning them into separate partnerships. 
Etc. Both elements seem present everywhere but the mixture of these elements turns 
out to be national and rather persisting over time. 
2/ universalism is not limited to France. France played a leading role in the universalist 
decriminalization of homosexuality. It did not in the creation of a universalist partner-
ship. 
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3/ at the opposite of universalism, there seems to be not one differentialism but two. One 
is community-based, identity-based and liberal, producing high visibility and relative-
ly high same-sex union frequencies. It is bottom-up differentialism, dominant in the 
UK and, less so, in Switzerland. The other is State-organized, vertical top-down dif-
ferentialism, producing little visibility and low same-sex union frequencies. It is dom-
inant in the Scandinavian and Germanic countries.  
 
Figure 5.  Same-sex union frequencies for 100 000 inhabitants in 2011 (2010 if country is 
marked with *). Differentialst (red) and universalist (blue) countries.  
 
Source: See Banens, 2010. 
 
Figure 5 shows same-sex union frequencies for 2011 (2010 if country is marked by *). 
Universalist countries show much higher frequencies than differentialist countries: 11,2 
against 6,4 same-sex unions for 100 000 inhabitants. My hypothesis is that universal stat-
utes are fit to integrate homosexuality into mainstream family life. They do not create 
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specific visibility but allow same-sex couples to reintegrate their family of origin and so-
cial environment. Differentialist statutes don’t. In community-based countries they allow 
same-sex couples to integrate the community. This explains rather high union frequencies 
in the UK and in Switzerland. But in the State-dominated countries, there is little motiva-
tion to integrate mainstream family life and not more motivation to integrate the LGBT 
community. Union rates are particularly low in Scandinavian and Germanic countries.  
So, the Western European management of homosexuality shows three blocks rather 
than two. A block of universalist integration of homosexuality in mainstream family life 
goes with low community visibility but high same-sex union frequencies. A second block 
of community-based differentialist homosexual minority building goes with high commu-
nity visibility and rather high same-sex union frequencies. A third block of State-
dominated differentialist individualism goes with low community visibility and low same-
sex union frequencies. The historical persistence of these blocks points to long-term struc-
tural differences that we may call anthropological. 
Yet, different anthropological managements of homosexuality respond to social con-
structions of homosexuality that seem rather comparable all over Western Europe. Evi-
dence comes from the rise of same-sex couples. Exact numbers of same-sex couples do 
not exist in any European country. Demographic data is rare and not always reliable. Fig-
ure 6 shows estimates from the three major West European countries. For the sake of 
comparison, the numbers have been calculated for 100 000 inhabitants.  
 
Figure 6. Estimated numbers of same-sex couples for 100 000 inhabitants. 
Country Source Year S-S Families for 100 000 inhbts 
France Census 2008   95 
France Family Survey 2011 130 
Germany Mikrozensus 2010   80 
UK Labor Force Survey 2012 220 
Source: See Banens et al., 2013. 
 
The German 2010 Mikrozensus estimates at 80 the number of same-sex families for 
100 000 inhabitants. That is close to our estimates on the base of the French 2008 Census 
(95 for 100 000), but a recent estimate on the base of a 2011 Family survey came up with 
considerably higher numbers: 130 for 100 000. The British 2012 Labor Force Survey’s 
estimate is much higher again: 220 for 100 000. But the main reason for this diversity of 
estimates may be not demographic reality but data sources and estimate technology. 
These are so different that we better avoid comparing numbers.  
Yet, we may compare growth rates. Unlike estimated numbers, estimated growth rates 
are independent of data sources and data treatment as long as sources and treatments re-
main the same. The German Mikrozensus may serve as an example. It produces estimates 
of same-sex family numbers every year since 1996. Data collection remained more or less 
the same from 1996 until now, except for a minor change in 2006. Each year, numbers 
may have been under- or overestimated due to some data collection problems, but the 
overall growth will hardly be biased.  
In the same way, British Labor Force Surveys produce annual estimates. Data collec-
tion and treatment are totally different from those used in the German Mikrozensus. Total 
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numbers should not be compared, but growth rates can and they bring important infor-
mation.  
 
Figure 7. Annual growth rates of same-sex couple estimates. 
Country Source Period Annual growth rate (%) 
France Census 2006-2010 6,4 
Germany Mikrozensus 1996-2008 5,1 
UK Labor Force Survey 2006-2012 8,9 
Source: See Banens et al., 2013. 
 
Growth rates turn out to be much closer than crude numbers. Moreover, they turn out to 
be very high in the three main West European countries. Estimated rates lead to 100 % 
increase every 8 (UK) to 14 (GER) years. This means that same-sex families may have 
doubled since the beginning of the century, they may have been multiplied by 10 since the 
start of the Aids epidemic, by 20 since 1970.  
No one really knows when the growth started. Some may even say it doesn’t exist, it 
could just reflect increasing visibility. Now, this seems rather unlikely (Banens and Le 
Penven, 2013). Current growth rates for same-sex families probably reflect reality. De-
mographically, this isn’t unknown. Single parent families and stepfamilies have known 
similar growths over the last decades, starting from almost nothing. So, in terms of de-
mographics, this is just one evolution among others. But for the social construction of 
homosexuality, it is major information. The first age of homosexuality, from the 19th cen-
tury until the 1960s, saw the emergence of the homosexual individual out of a loosely 
structured magma of homosexual practices. I once called this process the individualiza-
tion of homosexuality (Banens, 1981). The second age, from the 1960s on, sees the emer-
gence of the homosexual family (couple with or without children). We could call this pro-
cess the familiarization of homosexuality. Familiarization in both meanings: homosexu-
ality tends to get organized in stable, cohabiting couples and at the same time it becomes 
a familiar social reality. This seems to be the major social fact, the major trend of con-
temporary homosexuality, and the major engine behind the legal recognition of same-sex 
unions all over Europe.  
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